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Intentional contamination of a drinking watersystem may be discovered in several ways. Ifthe potential contamination is unannounced or
covert, its first indications might be detected by the
water utility operating the system or by the public
health system. In contrast, if a terrorist group
announces a contamination event (or the threat of
one), water utilities and the health-care system both
may learn about the event simultaneously through
such channels as mass media. Various other
scenarios are also possible, such as a threat being
telephoned to a water utility. In all of these scenarios,
water utilities and the public health system must work
together to respond to real or threatened
contamination of drinking water supplies.
Water Utility and Public Health
System Responses to Drinking
Water Contamination
If an event involves an obvious security breach
related to drinking water, the water utility would
likely be the first to uncover the possibility of
contamination. Security breaches associated with
vandalism such as cutting locks or fences, are not
uncommon. However, recent terrorism events and
increased awareness of terrorist intentions have
highlighted the need to handle these situations
differently than in the past.  As stated by the Florida
Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) in
a letter to water plant owners and operators:
“. . . we live in a new era. We must be much more
vigilant and responsive about the security of our
water supply systems to protect the public. Incidents,
that in the past may have been viewed as acts of
mischief and vandalism, now need to be fully
investigated and managed seriously” (Florida DEP
2003a).
One element of managing these situations is
informing local and state health departments, and
involving them in response efforts. This has not
always occurred in a timely manner. For example,
in a recent drinking water system security breach
in Florida that involved forced entry into water
system facilities, 36 hours elapsed between when
the utility discovered the problem and when they
notified the state health department (WaterTech
2003). Events such as this prompted a change in
policy in Florida to require water utilities to notify a
designated state emergency response hotline within
two hours after any suspicious incident (Florida DEP
2003b).
Health departments need to know about potential
drinking water contamination because they may need
to be involved in responding to potential
contamination incidents. Important elements of a
response in the public health system include
investigation of any unusual patterns of illnesses,
dissemination of guidance to the public to safeguard
health, and preparation of treatment for people
affected by contamination (Fig. 1). Therefore, water
utilities and the public health system must not only
communicate but also actively work together to
effectively respond to potential contamination events
involving security breaches of water system
facilities.
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Figure 1. Response to a Water Contamination Event: Detection in Water Utility
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Although methods exist for real time detection
of some contaminants in drinking water distribution
systems, such diagnostic tools are neither well
developed for detection of multiple unknown
contaminants nor deployed in a widespread manner.
Therefore, if contamination does not involve an
obvious security breach of drinking water system
facilities, the first indication of contamination may
be patients seeking medical assistance at health care
facilities. The patients themselves may not know
what made them sick. However, if multiple patients
have similar symptoms, health-care facilities would
notify public health agencies, which would begin
investigating the cause and source of the illness. In
the case of potential drinking water contamination,
effective responses will require collaboration
between water utilities and public health agencies.
Although the public health system may discover the
initial contamination, much of the response will take
place in the water utility arena, including actions
such as identifying likely locations where an agent
may have been introduced into the water system,
decontaminating the drinking water distribution
system, and disposing of contaminated water (Fig. 2).
Although it was naturally occurring,
Cryptosporidium contamination of the Milwaukee
drinking water supply in 1993 provided an example
of a contamination event discovered in the public
health arena (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention [CDC] 1995). During a heavy rainfall
event, Cryptosporidium in the city’s surface water
source passed through the municipal treatment
system and into the drinking water distribution
system. At that time, the city’s drinking water
treatment plant was not operating at optimal levels
for treatment of Cryptosporidium, and high turbidity
levels caused by the rainfall as well as cold
temperatures contributed to the treatment system’s
lack of effectiveness against the organism. As people
ingested the parasite, many became ill with
gastrointestinal symptoms, especially diarrhea.
Public health officials discovered the contamination
because so many people sought treatment,
especially over-the-counter anti-diarrheal
medications. However, long-term response to the
problem was the responsibility of the water utility
who upgraded the drinking water treatment system
to make it effective against Cryptosporidium.
If a terrorist group announces real or threatened
contamination of drinking water in the media or
directly to a water utility or public health agency, a
solid partnership between water utilities and public
Figure 1. Response to a Water Contamination Event: Detection in Water Utility
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health agencies also would be required to deal
effectively with the event. To protect the public’s
health, decisions would need to be made quickly
about, for example, whether chlorine is effective
against the suspected agent, whether the affected
area of the distribution system can be isolated, or
whether a boil-water notice should be issued. Public
health authorities can often provide credible
messages to the public, but will need critical
information from water utilities to craft the most
appropriate messages. Quickly disseminating
information to the public also will be an important
element of a response, especially when terrorism
may be involved. Confusing and potentially
conflicting messages need to be avoided, especially
regarding actions the public should take to protect
itself, highlighting the need for coordination.
Communication problems were an issue for some
communities during the widespread electricity
blackouts in the Northeastern and Midwestern
United States in 2003, when utilities and public health
agencies issued boil-water orders with conflicting
information. The resulting confusion highlighted the
need for better coordination between water utilities
and the public health system in responding to
emergencies.
Barriers to Collaboration Between
Water Utilities and Public Health
Agencies
Local public health agencies and water utilities
have not always interacted and collaborated closely.
Effective regulations and monitoring requirements
have prevented large-scale public health problems
in the United States related to drinking water except
for occasional failures in disinfection. In addition,
many health departments are not involved in the
regulation and monitoring of water supplies,
especially for larger municipal systems. State
environmental management or environmental quality
agencies (which generally are not part of state or
local health departments) often monitor drinking
water systems. Unless a disease outbreak involves
water, these groups have little need to interact.
Differing technical language used by public health
agencies and water utilities also present barriers to
effective communication, especially if these groups
have not interacted in the past.
Private contractors operating water utilities may
be reluctant to engage with local public health
entities because disclosure of information may affect
the status of their contracts with local government.
Figure 2. Response to a Water Contamination Event: Detection in Public Health System
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Additionally, funding is not targeted to facilitate and
maintain relationships between public health agencies
and water utilities. Both water utilities and public
health agencies have limited budgets and lack
resources to get involved with activities outside of
their legal mandates.
Promoting Linkages Between Water
Utilities and Public Health Agencies
Because of the potential for intentional
contamination of drinking water supplies, water
utilities and public health agencies are beginning to
develop closer relationships. At the federal level, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), in
conjunction with other federal partners such as
CDC, is developing a response protocol toolbox for
responding to drinking water contamination threats
and incidents. The toolbox contains information to
assist both water utilities and public health agencies
in emergency responses related to drinking water
(EPA 2003).
The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Act (Public Law 107-
188) requires drinking water facilities to conduct
vulnerability assessments and prepare emergency
response plans.  Implementing or updating these
emergency response plans will increase opportunities
for public health agency involvement in planning and
responses at the local level. EPA’s newly released
Response Protocol Tool Box also encourages
involvement and inclusion of public health agencies
in water utility response plans (EPA 2003). In
addition, EPA is organizing water security training
sessions to educate water utilities, public health
agencies, law enforcement, and local governments
about water security issues and the need for
increased communication and partnerships. CDC
and the American Water Works Association are
piloting smaller workshops specifically designed to
bring local health department and utility staff together
to address problems related to water security.
Public health agencies in several major cities
throughout the United States are implementing
syndromic surveillance programs designed to detect
anomalies in disease patterns through the collection
and combination of multiple electronic data sources
before confirmed diagnoses are made. Although not
specifically designed to detect waterborne events,
the data gathered through these sources may help
increase the speed at which events are detected
and data are analyzed (Mandl et al 2003).
Conclusions and Recommendations
Water utilities and public health agencies need
to develop stronger working relationships in order
to prepare for potential  drinking water
contamination events. In some cases, these
groups previously have collaborated to address
specific problems such as Cryptosporidium in
water, and those efforts can provide a template
for collaboration related to terrorism
preparedness, such as in the formation of local
task forces (CDC 1997). Continued opportunities
to collaborate also should be provided through
ongoing training, planning, and joint exercises.
For example, tabletop exercises can be useful
for both water utilities and public health agencies
in identifying gaps in preparedness,
communication, and response.
Information sharing between utilities and
public health agencies can enhance detection and
response. For example, increased complaints to
water utilities or public health agencies related
to water could indicate a problem when coupled
with other public health surveillance data. Cross-
referencing information,  such as water-
distribution maps and locations of illness cases,
also could improve responses. However, such
sharing would require that agreements be in place
to allow for information exchange without
compromising confidentiality issues for patients
or utilities.
Establishment of formal agreements may help
ensure regular exchange between utilities and
public health agencies.  In some cases,
requirements, such as the Florida policy requiring
notification of security breaches at drinking
water facilities, may need to be mandated. The
actual mechanisms will vary among locations, but
state and local governments should explore ways
to ensure regular communication between these
entities.
Some efforts probably will require funding
dedicated to maintaining collaboration in planning
and preparedness by water utilities and public
health agencies. However, such collaboration will
help ensure these entities are better equipped
and trained to respond to both intentional and
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naturally occurring drinking water contamination
events.
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